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Tuning Out the Electorate: Early
Network Projections and Decreased
Voter Turnout
by JEFF POLSKY*
I
Introduction
The average American household operates a television set
for over seven hours a day.' Sixty percent of the population
relies primarily on television for its news.2 Clearly, television
exerts a significant impact on our ideas and beliefs. Television
is particularly influential on those ideas and beliefs which de-
termine how we vote.
Scholars and judges agree that a well-informed public is the
foundation of a successful system of self-government.4 "In a
republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citi-
zenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is
essential. ' 5 Accordingly, political speech 6 is granted the high-
est degree of first amendment protection.7
Recently, however, it has been contended that rather than
helping people become more knowledgeable voters,8 television
is dissuading them from voting at all.9 When a presidential
* Member, Third Year Class; A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1982.
1. TV Viewing Climbs to Historic Level of 7 Hours a Day, San Francisco Exam-
iner, Jan. 25, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
2. Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quot-
ing CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
3. Id.
4. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1975).
5. Id.
6. Political speech is "speech intimately related to the process of governing."
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
7. CBS, 629 F.2d at 24. See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15; Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. See Weisman & Bedell, Something is Missing in TV's Political Coverage, TV
GUIDE, July 5, 1980, at 24 (arguing that networks cover political campaigns without ref-
erence to important issues).
9. See generally Early Election Returns and Projections Affecting the Electoral
Process: Hearings Before the Comm. on House Administration, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
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election results in a landslide,10 the major networks have been
able to announce a winner hours before the polls close.
There are two techniques available to networks in making
their projections. The traditional method is to wait for the
votes to be counted in specially selected precincts believed to
be representative of larger regions. 2 With the advent of com-
puters and increasingly sophisticated sampling techniques,
earlier projections have become possible. 3
The newest and most controversial 4 technique involves exit
polling, which relies on interviews with voters leaving sample
precincts. 15 By relying heavily on the results of exit polls in
1980, NBC was able to scoop its competition by over an hour.'6
As other networks start to rely on exit polls, projections can be
made earlier and earlier. 7 There is evidence that, by project-
ing the outcome of presidential elections hours before the polls
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. These hearings are relied on extensively in this
note. They provide the most comprehensive treatment of the subject now available.
Additional hearings were conducted in February 1984. See Mayer, TV News Officials
Plan to Keep Projecting Election Winners Before All Votes Are Cast, Wall St. J., Feb. 28,
1984, at 58, col. 1. See also Election Day Practices and Election Projections: Hearings
Before the Task Force on Elections of the Comm. on House Administration and the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protections and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1982).
10. Landslides in presidential elections have occurred in 1964, 1972, 1980, and 1984.
See Hearings, supra note 9, at 55 (statement of Dr. Austin Ranney, resident scholar,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
11. In 1980, NBC announced a Reagan victory at 8:15 p.m. eastern standard time
(EST), almost 3 hours before the polls closed in the West. ABC and CBS followed at
9:52 p.m. and 10:32 p.m. EST, respectively. In 1972, NBC called Nixon the winner at 8:30
p.m. EST, and CBS followed 20 minutes later. Id. at 151-52 (statement of Raymond E.
Wolfinger, professor of political science, University of California). The election of 1984
resulted in a landslide of even greater magnitude than those mentioned above, see
supra note 10, thus allowing networks to again make their projections before all the
polls had closed. The 1984 election raises some interesting questions. For instance, it
may be that when one candidate goes into the election with such a commanding lead
as that held by President Reagan, the public reaction to early network projections is
lessened. It also remains to be seen what impact resulted from the networks making a
stronger attempt to encourage people to vote despite the apparent certainty of a Rea-
gan victory. Unfortunately, as this note goes to print, the data required to assess the
impact on voter turnout in the 1984 election is not available.
12. Id. at 159 (statement of Percy H. Tannenbaum, professor of public policy and
director, Survey Research Center, University of California).
13. Id. at 158.
14. News Groups Sue to Overturn Exit Poll Ban, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 13,
1983, at 28, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as News Groups Sue].
15. Hearings, supra note 9, at 159 (statement of Percy H. Tannenbaum).
16. Id. See also supra note 11.
17. Hearings, supra note 9, at 95 (statement of Royce Crocker, analyst, Congres-
sional Research Service, Library of Congress).
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close, television networks deter some voters from even going to
the polls. 18 The impact of early projections is most heavily felt
in the western part of the nation where a larger percentage of
people have not yet voted when the projections are made. 9
This note takes a three-pronged approach to the issue of de-
creased voter turnout resulting from early network projections.
First, it discusses the studies and other evidence that identify
the effects of early projections to illustrate the significance of
the problem. Second, the note then examines possible solu-
tions and determines that the only feasible solution would be
direct restrictions preventing the news media from broadcast-
ing their projections before the polls close nationwide. Third,
the first amendment ramifications of this suggestion are ex-
plored. The note concludes that such direct regulation would
in fact serve to protect "the successful operation of the political
process," 20 which is the primary goal of the first amendment.
II
The Problem
Since 1960, the number of registered voters participating in
presidential elections has declined steadily.21 Although the
problem of decreasing voter turnout is multifaceted, and any
attempt to assess the impact of a single factor is a formidable
task, the problem has nevertheless been approached from a va-
riety of viewpoints. 22
A. Public Opinion Surveys
Shortly after the 1980 election, a national survey conducted
18. See infra text accompanying notes 21-58.
19. Recent concessions by the networks as a result of bipartisan pressure do not
eliminate the problem. ABC and NBC have agreed not to project the outcome of vot-
ing in a state before the polls close. See Mayer, supra note 9, at 58, col. 1. Despite these
voluntary restraints, networks could still base a projection on voting in the East in
time to discourage voters in other parts of the country where the polls are still open.
In fact, the projections have traditionally been. made after voting has stopped in the
East. See supra note 11.
20. A. BICKEL, THE MoRALrrY OF CONSENT 62 (1975).
21. In 1960, 62.8% of registered voters cast ballots. By 1980 the figure had dropped
to 53.9%. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 74 (statement of Curtis Gans). Voting in off-
year elections, i.e., those without a presidential race, has averaged 13 percentage
points lower over the same period. Id. at 151 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
22. Although flaws in the various studies will be identified, detailed analysis of the
methodologies used is beyond the scope of this note. See generally P. TANNENBAUM &
L. KosTIcH, TURNED-ON TV/TURNED-OFF VOTERS (1983).
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by the Los Angeles Times reported that seventy-one percent of
registered voters believed that broadcasters should be prohib-
ited from making projections before the polls close nation-
wide.23 This opinion was not isolated to the western states, but
was shared by voters across the country.24 More importantly,
according to this study, 2.4% of registered voters reportedly did
not go to the polls because of early projections. 5 CBS and the
New York Times also conducted a nationwide survey in late
November 1980. In this survey, three percent of the registered
voters questioned gave early projections as their reason for not
voting.26
Other surveys were conducted on a local level. In a tele-
phone survey conducted in January 1981 by the Field Institute
in San Francisco, ten percent of those who said they were reg-
istered but did not vote specifically blamed their failure to vote
on the early network projections .2  That same month a survey
conducted by the County of Los Angeles reported that early
projections had a negative impact on voter participation of two
or three percent.28
There are two problems inherent in surveys of this nature.
First, nonvoters may be unable to accurately analyze the rea-
sons for their action or, in this case, their failure to act. "A sur-
vey instrument no matter how well drawn still suffers from
post-election reflection. ' '29 Second, the group targeted by these
surveys, people who were registered but did not vote, is only
about ten percent of the sample population. 0 As the sample
23. Hearings, supra note 9, at 65.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id.
27. This percentage translates to 401,000 votes. Id. at 116 (testimony of March Fong
Eu, Secretary of State, California).
28. Id. at 64.
29. Id. at 75 (statement of Curtis Gans). See also id. at 151 (statement of Raymond
E. Wolfinger).
30. Id. at 75 (statement of Curtis Gans). These figures have been used to discount
a series of surveys after the 1964 election which showed that early calls in that year did
not discourage voters. Id. at 151 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger). Network news
officials still rely on these studies arguing that there is only a "perceived problem." Id.
at 7 (testimony of William A. Leonard, President, CBS News); id. at 11 (statement of
Richard C. Wald, Sr., Vice President-News, ABC News); News Gruops Sue, supra
note 14. But see Hearings, supra note 9, at 168 (statement of Clinton T. Reilly, cam-
paign consultant) ("[Ilt is just plain irresponsible for a network news president to
testify before Congress ... that network projections had no impact on voter turnout,
or that no election outcome anywhere was influenced by these projections.").
[Vol. 6
EARLY NETWORK PROJECTIONS
size upon which the data is based decreases, the margin of er-
ror increases. "[T] he margin of error in a conventional survey
is about three percent of the entire sample and considerably
larger for parts of the sample."'"
B. The Voter Supplement to the Census Bureau's Current
Population Survey
The Census Bureau conducts a current population survey
every month which provides data on over 90,000 people.2 In
November of each election year there is a voter supplement to
the survey, which asks, among other things, the time of day at
which a vote was cast.33 Raymond E. Wolfinger and Peter Lin-
quiti, both of the University of California, used the voter sup-
plement data from 1972 and 197414 and concluded that there
was a 2.7% decrease in voter turnout for those years. 5
A study of this nature avoids the problems discussed with
respect to public opinion surveys-voter rationalization of a
failure to vote and high margins of error resulting from a small
sample size. However, the problem with Wolfinger and Lin-
quiti's conclusion is the uncertainty involved in attributing a
lower-than-expected turnout to the networks' projections.3 6
Their study provided no direct evidence that the decrease in
late voting in the Pacific states was due to any one variable.37
However, by ruling out the most plausible alternative explana-
tions for the decrease-weather, changes in poll closing times,
and differences among the types of people who voted-the
Wolfinger and Linquiti study does support the inference that
early projections are responsible for the decrease. 8
31. Hearings, supra note 9, at 154 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
32. Wolfinger & Linquiti, Tuning In and Turning Out, PUBLIC OPINION, Feb.-Mar.
1981, at 57 [hereinafter cited as Wolfinger].
33. Id.
34. Nixon's landslide victory in 1972 prompted early network projections as seen
supra note 11. Of course, 1974 was not a presidential election year, and total turnout in
off-year elections is lower, see supra note 21. Nevertheless, Wolfinger and Linquiti con-
tended that the proportion of people voting after six o'clock could be expected to re-
main the same once other factors are taken into account.
35. Based on findings from 1974, Wolfinger and Linquiti determined what voter
turnout should have been in 1972, after six o'clock, in five Pacific states (California,
Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska). From this they subtracted the actual after-
six turnout in those states and attributed the discrepancy to network projections of the
outcome of the presidential election. Wolfinger, supra note 32, at 57.
36. Hearings, supra note 9, at 92-93 (statement of Royce Crocker).
37. Id. at 153.
38. Wolfinger, supra note 32, at 56-58.
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C. University of Michigan Study
The National Election Studies Group of the Center for Polit-
ical Studies at the University of Michigan conducted perhaps
the most comprehensive study of election night reporting and
voter turnout.3 9 Their 1980 presidential election study involved
interviews by phone and in person with a nationally represen-
tative sample of voters.40 The interviews were conducted in
1980 from January-June (primary election interviews), Sep-
tember-October (pre-election), and November-December
(post-election). 4 ' Of the respondents, 1,814 were then
reinterviewed by telephone to learn the time of day they had
voted and what election coverage they had watched or heard.42
The Center for Political Studies then used poll books from pre-
cincts where their respondents were registered to verify which
respondents actually voted and which were eligible to vote."
Several aspects of election coverage were examined: the pro-
jections of the outcome itself, reports of actual returns, news of
Carter's early concession speech," and newspaper discussions
of election information on election day.45
According to the study, newspaper coverage and coverage of
actual returns "had no appreciable effect on turnout for people
who had not voted by the time they were exposed to the
news. ' 46 However, forty-seven percent of the respondents
heard ... [network] projections of the outcome before [poll
closing] time. The impact of this information on the likelihood
of voting was substantial and significant. Within representa-
tive groups of eligible people in [the] sample, who (1) had the
average likelihood of voting, who (2) had not voted by the time
news coverage began, and who (3) still had until 8 p.m. local
time to vote, the estimated proportion voting dropped by 20 to
25 percent if they heard Carter's speech, the projected out-
come, or both. If this entire group of possible voters is added to
39. Hearings, supra note 9, at 330-48 (reprinting Election Reporting and Voter
Turnout, a study conducted by the Center for Political Studies, University of
Michigan).
40. Id. at 334.
41. Id. at 334, 345.
42. Id. at 334.
43. Id.
44. President Carter conceded defeat at 9:45 p.m. EST on election day in 1980.
NBC had projected his loss an hour and a half earlier. Id. at 151 (statement of Ray-
mond E. Wolfinger).
45. Id. at 331 (reprinting the University of Michigan study).
46. Id.
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the larger group of citizens who had voted before election cov-
erage began, the overall turnout rate for the combined groups
dropped by 6 to 11 percent as a result of non-voting among
those who had not voted when they heard news of the election
outcome.4 7
It is difficult to quantitatively assess the effect of early net-
work projections on the 1980 election in light of the impact of
Carter's concession. Of course, "no one is proposing to muzzle
presidential candidates on election night .... ,,41 Hearing the
concession straight from the horse's mouth would arguably
have a greater effect than learning about it from an anchorper-
son with little at stake on the outcome. However, as previously
noted,49 NBC viewers had learned of a projected Reagan vic-
tory one and one-half hours before Carter conceded.
The University of Michigan study does contend that there is
no difference in effect between hearing both the projection and
the concession and hearing only one;5" it concluded that the
projection and concession each had an appreciable effect and,
considered independently, accounted for a six to eleven per-
cent decrease in turnout."' Therefore, apart from Carter's con-
cession, the broadcasting of early projections, according to the
study, had a significant impact on the election.
D. Summary of Findings
None of these studies flawlessly bridges the gap between
cause and effect. However, even if one accounts for the limita-
tions of the research methods employed, these surveys and
studies support the proposition that early network projections
of the outcome of presidential elections effect a decrease in
voter turnout.
The precise number of people affected by network projec-
tions is more difficult to estimate. Research conducted by
Wolfinger and Linquiti suggests that in 1972, 454,410 people in
the Pacific states (337,000 in California or 7,800 per congres-
sional district) failed to vote as a result of the early network
projections.52 March Fong Eu, Secretary of State for Califor-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 152 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
49. See supra note 11. See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 330 (reprinting the Uni-
versity of Michigan study).
50. Hearings, supra note 9, at 331 (reprinting the University of Michigan study).
51. Id.
52. Wolfinger, supra note 32, at 58.
No. 41
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nia, who testified as California's Chief Elections Officer,53 cited
figures indicating that 401,000 Californians failed to vote in 1980
because networks had called the outcome early on election
night.54
These figures are significant, not because of their effect on a
presidential race,55 but rather because of their impact on con-
gressional and local elections. These elections are generally
decided much later on election night and by a smaller number
of voters. As discussed above, the various studies generally
point to a decrease in voter turnout of at least two percent due
to early network projections. 6 It is unclear how this two per-
cent decrease would affect any particular congressional or lo-
cal election, since it is impossible to determine how those who
failed to turn out would have voted .5  Exit polls, which only
question actual voters, are particularly unsuitable for studying
which voters were most discouraged by early projections. Nev-
ertheless, many races are decided by far less than two
percent.58
A problem regarding early network projections evidently
does exist. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the pro-
posed solutions.
III
Possible Solutions
For over fifteen years, Congress has considered numerous
proposals for solving the problem of early projections 9.5  The
Senate has twice passed legislation to make projections more
difficult, but neither proposal survived consideration by the
House.6" One bill, providing for a uniform time for poll closing,
was considered in 1972.61 A second bill, in 1973, sought to pro-
53. Hearings, supra note 9, at 114-15 (testimony of March Fong Eu).
54. Id.
55. Presumably, the winners of those races have been determined when the net-
works project a winner.
56. This is a conservative figure as most of the evidence points towards a greater
impact. See generally supra text accompanying notes 22-53.
57. Hearings, supra note 9, at 75 (statement of Curtis Gans).
58. In 1980, the race for the congressional seat in California's 21st District was de-
cided by 752 votes, or approximately one-half of one percent of the total vote. Id. at 117
(testimony of March Fong Eu).
59. Id. at 353.
60. Id. at 63.
61. H.R. 14,085, 92d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1972).
[Vol. 6
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hibit disclosure of election results before midnight eastern
standard time (EST).62 After the 1980 election, at least a dozen
bills were presented in the ninety-seventh Congress to address
the problem,63 but none has yet been adopted.
The proposals advanced fall into four categories: uniform
poll closing hours, limitations on the disclosure of election in-
formation by election officials, restrictions on exit polling, and
regulations prohibiting the networks from broadcasting their
projections until the polls close.
A. Uniform Polling Hours
Most of the proposed solutions focus on the idea that if polls
close at the same time nationwide, voters, particularly those in
the West, will not be exposed to early projections. These pro-
posals usually contain some added measures to alleviate the
disadvantages of closing the polls earlier in the East. One ex-
ample is a proposal to have Sunday voting,64 an idea which was
greeted favorably by religious leaders and one which has been
used successfully in Europe.65 A similar proposal is to make
election day a national holiday, with all polls closing at the
same time.6 Finally, it has been suggested that elections be
spread over two days with all polls closing at 9:00 p.m. EST.67
A problem shared by all of these proposals is that making
early returns unavailable does not prevent the networks from
basing projections on exit polls.68 As mentioned earlier, exit
polls were relied on by NBC in 1980 to make its early projection
of a Reagan victory at 8:15 p.m. EST.69 Since "'exit polls' can
be completed long before the voting is over,"7 early projec-
tions could still be made under any proposal that affected only
polling hours.7 Despite this obvious weakness, uniform poll
closing is the solution most frequently advocated by the
62. S. 2099, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
63. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: A
STATUS REPORT 125-26 (1983).
64. H.R. 84, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
65. Hearings, supra note 9, at 109 (testimony of Hon. Vic Fazio).
66. H.R. 1813, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
67. S. 55, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
68. Hearings, supra note 9, at 95 (statement of Royce Crocker).
69. See supra note 11.
70. Wolfinger, supra note 32, at 60.
71. Id.
No. 4]
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networks.72
B. Limitations on Disclosure by Election Officials
Another suggestion is to change the time at which the re-
turns become available.7 3 Again, such a proposal will not pre-
vent the networks from relying on exit polls. 7 4 Furthermore,
many fear that delayed vote counting would increase the op-
portunity for fraud.75 Although increased security might rem-
edy this latter problem, 76 any proposal which does not address
the practice of exit polling would be ineffective.
C. Restrictions on Exit Polling
Virtually all states have laws prohibiting certain activities
within a specified distance (usually 100 feet) from the polling
place.77 Although the statutes generally do not mention exit
polling by name, they effectively prohibit this activity.78 The
State of Washington, however, in its statute specifically prohib-
its exit polling within 300 feet of a polling place.7 9 As a result,
the three major networks, the New York Times, and the Ever-
ett (Washington) Daily Herald have recently brought suit to
overturn the state law.8
The plaintiffs in Daily Herald Co. v. Munro"' claim that the
Washington law "impermissibly restricts speech and commen-
tary ... about the electoral process ... and thus violates the
First Amendment."82 They assert the importance of informa-
tion obtained by exit polls and argue that it constitutes polit-
ical speech, a type of communication traditionally given a high
degree of protection.83
The data obtained through election day voter polls is used by
72. News Groups Sue, supra note 14. See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 95 (state-
ment of Royce Crocker)and 351 (memorandum of ABC).
73. Hearings, supra note 9, at 155 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 15 (testimony of William J. Small).
76. Id. at 159 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
77. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 29,470 (West 1984).
78. Hearings, supra note 9, at 155 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 29.51.020 (1974) (amended 1983).
80. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T (W.D. Wash. filed Dec. 12, 1983) (as
this note goes to print, the lower court's order declaring the Washington law constitu-
tional is pending expedited appeal before the Ninth Circuit).
81. Id.
82. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 9, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 126-32.
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scholars in many disciplines including, inter alia, political
scientists, sociologists, and historians to analyze and comment
upon how and why people have voted and to identify and com-
ment on social and political trends .... [These] polls are the
most reliable and accurate method for gathering information
from voters themselves on election day about how and why
they have voted.84
In addition, the plaintiffs argue that the new law is unconsti-
tutional because it is a restriction impermissibly based on con-
tent, rather than one validly regulating the time, place, or
manner of an activity. 5 In order to constitute a valid time,
place, or manner restriction, regulations must "serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest and leave ample alternative chan-
nels for communication. ' ' 86 The plaintiffs allege that the
Washington law fails to meet this standard because it is specif-
ically directed at information concerning election results and
thus makes the gathering and reporting of such information
impossible. 7
The defendants, Munro and the State of Washington, argue
that the statute is a constitutionally permissible manner of
preventing the plaintiffs from interfering with the rights of vot-
ers to exercise their franchise and the rights of states to over-
see the administration of the polling place.8 This latter right-
to prescribe the "times, places and manner of holding elec-
tions"-is guaranteed by the Constitution. 9
In order to make more credible its argument that the new
law is a permissible time, place, or manner restriction, the
State of Washington must minimize the importance of exit
polls in analyzing election results. The defendants contend
that other sources of information on voting patterns are avail-
able and that the plaintiffs overstate the ability to examine exit
polls to accurately predict the election outcome.90 The state
can be expected to stress that the plaintiffs still have access to
voting information through the actual returns and other forms
84. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 8, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980)
(invalidating an order by a public utilities commission that prevented a utility com-
pany from including inserts advocating nuclear power in monthly electric bills).
87. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 8, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T.
88. Defendants' Answer at 4-5, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
90. Defendants' Answer at 6, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T.
No. 41
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of polling which do not disrupt voting.9 They contend that the
plaintiffs are less concerned with accuracy than with the com-
mercial gain that comes from an early projection of the out-
come.92 Network coverage of the November 1981 New Jersey
gubernatorial election provides support for the defendants'
claim of inaccuracy in exit polling.93
If the defendants are able to establish that prohibiting exit
polls does not deprive the plaintiffs of access to important in-
formation about voting, the Washington exit poll law should be
upheld. This argument might succeed if the state emphasizes
that alternative methods remain available and that the infor-
mation is inaccurate to begin with. However, even if the law is
found to be valid, and similar or stricter measures are adopted
in other states, a solution to the problem of early network pro-
jection is still needed:
Exit polling is not ... the only way to interview voters. If it
were made too difficult, the networks doubtless would revert
on election day to the telephone interviewing technique they
use all through the year for surveys of public opinion and vot-
ing intentions .... Putting exit polling out of business would
not keep the networks from calling an election, but would give
them fewer that they could call safely.94
Thus, restricting exit polls would be only a partial solution.
As it has been shown, the networks are continually advancing
quicker and more accurate ways to project the outcome of an
election before the polls close.9" "The networks are very deter-
mined, very competitive, very skilled; they are insisting on get-
ting the word out . ,96 Permanent solutions must,
91. Id. at 7.
92. In their answer, "[d]efendants allege that information furnished by plaintiffs
from conduct of this allegedly 'reliable and accurate' methodology has been incorrect
and is known to plaintiffs to have incorrectly predicted election results on numerous
occasions. Despite this knowledge, they have disseminated such information for the
purpose of commercial gain." Id.
93. In this extremely close race, all three networks were conducting exit polls.
ABC and CBS projected that James Florio, the Democratic candidate, had beaten his
Republican opponent, Thomas Keen. Later, CBS withdrew its projection. NBC then
announced that Keen had won but subsequently retracted its projection as well. Keen
was eventually declared the winner, and the networks were left trying to explain the
mishap to their viewers. P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH, supra note 22, at 133.
94. Hearings, supra note 9, at 155 (statement of Raymond E. Wolfinger) and 141-42
(testimony of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
95. See supra notes 13, 17. See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 330 (reprinting the
University of Michigan study).
96. Hearings, supra note 9, at 141-42 (testimony of Raymond E. Wolfinger).
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therefore, do more than merely provide obstacles to early net-
work projections; they must address the problem directly.
D. Prohibiting Early Network Projections
Having determined that the other proposed solutions would
be ineffective to reduce television's impact on voter turnout,
one must therefore consider direct restrictions on the broad-
casting of early network projections. In Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Service Commission,97 the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the first amendment to allow a regulation
when it is a "narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling
state interest."98 Direct regulation must therefore be evaluated
according to this standard.
Focusing first on the interest served, one can argue that re-
stricting early network projections can improve voter turnout
and thereby help insure that government remains responsible
to the will of the majority. "Preserving the integrity of the elec-
toral process ... and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsi-
bility of the individual ... for the wise conduct of government'
are interests of the highest importance."99 These interests are
jeopardized by early network projections when a significant
number of potential voters are discouraged from casting
ballots.100
In order to narrowly tailor the proposed regulation to the
problem at hand, the restrictions advocated here would only
prevent broadcasting by television or radio of the outcome of
presidential elections before the polls close nationwide. Re-
ports of actual returns and newspaper coverage would not be
affected, as they cause "no appreciable [decrease in] turn-
out."''1 Additionally, ample alternative channels of communi-
cation would remain available. The only message restricted is
97. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
98. Id. at 535.
99. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo).
100. This is not to say that all speech that discourages voters should be restricted.
An editorial arguing that individual votes are insignificant or that there is no real
choice among candidates may arguably decrease voter turnout. Even if an effect were
reliably shown, the problem could not be regulated in a neutral manner. "[Allthough
the government may play a role in regulating the content of broadcast communica-
tions, that role must be carefully neutral as to which speakers or viewpoints are to
prevail in the marketplace of ideas." CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Tamm, J., concurring).
101. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 331.
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the networks' impression that the race is over while the polls
are still open. It is necessary to more fully explore the consti-
tutionality of any direct restriction on the broadcasting of early
projections to determine whether first amendment values jus-
tify such restrictions.
IV
Restrictions on the Broadcasting of Early Network
Projections: First Amendment Ramifications
In 1965, Justice Brennan stated,
[Tihe Supreme Court's concern with the true significance of
the first amendment has been primarily confined to the last
fifty years. That is not a long time in the history of constitu-
tional interpretation, not long enough in any event to justify
the assumption that the Court has yet spoken the final word.10 2
A principle that is firmly established, however, is the principle
that first amendment rights are not absolute. 103 Justice Frank-
furter, concurring in Dennis v. United States,104 pointed out
that "[t] he language of the First Amendment is to be read not
as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of his-
toric experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who
employed them."'1 5 Interpreting these "symbols of historic ex-
perience" is a formidable task. The authors of the amendment
could not have foreseen how their guarantee of freedom of the
press would evolve as it played a fundamental role in our na-
tion's development. 10 6 Nevertheless, the framers of the Bill of
Rights did intend to protect certain specific values, and these
values should guide any discussion of the amendment. "[S] o
long as first amendment values remain obscure, clarity will
never emerge from first amendment analysis.' 0 7
A. Freedom of the Press and a Democratic System of Government
The courts have frequently stated the paramount impor-
102. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1965).
103. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 749 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
104. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
105. Id. at 523 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
106. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 264.
107. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L REV. 299, 300 (1978). See also Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1971).
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tance of first amendment freedoms in our democratic system.
In Mills v. Alabama, °8 the Court acknowledged the "practi-
cally universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmen-
tal affairs."'1 9 The rationale for this position is that "speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government.""'  Therefore, in order to preserve
"an alert and knowledgeable democratic society,""' the
Supreme Court and "the Founding Fathers [have given] the
free press the protections it must have to fulfill its essential
role in our democracy. ' 12
Commentators, such as Alexander Meiklejohn,1 3 have also
recognized this critical link. As early as 1948, Meiklejohn
stated that "[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs
from the necessities of the program of self-government.""' 4 His
conclusion was based on an analysis of the structure of the
Constitution" 5 and was later echoed by the Supreme Court in
Garrison v. Louisiana.1 6 According to Lillian BeVier,
commentators have never seriously questioned [Meiklejohn's]
basic conclusion that the constitutional process of self-govern-
ment provides an indispensable clue to the meaning of the first
amendment.
The constitutional establishment of a representative democ-
racy implies certain conclusions about the type of speech the
amendment must protect from abridgement .... [TIhe
amendment protects the process of forming and expressing the
will of the majority according to which our representatives
must govern. 1 17
Another constitutional scholar, Alexander Bickel" 8 has
108. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
109. Id. at 218.
110. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (quoting Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
111. In re American Independent Party, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 62
F.C.C.2d 4, para. 10 (1976) (quoting S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st sess. 10 (1959)).
112. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
113. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT (1948); Brennan, supra note 102.
114. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 113, at 26.
115. Meiklejohn noted that the Constitution first established a democratic form of
government and then, to ensure its effectiveness, protected speech and the press.
Meiklejohn, supra note 106, at 254, 264.
116. Brennan, supra note 102, at 18.
117. BeVier, supra note 107, at 309. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 62.
118. Bickel authored THE MORALIrY OF CONSENT, supra note 20, and argued for the
petitioner in New York Times, 403 U.S. 713.
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stated, "[T] he social interest that the First Amendment vindi-
cates is. . . the interest in the successful operation of the polit-
ical process, so that the country may better be able to adopt
the course of action that conforms to the wishes of the greatest
number . ,.119 Our concern here is not whether first amend-
ment protection should be limited to speech which "serves to
make the political process work. ' 120 It is enough to note that
"[the Amendment has a 'central meaning'-a core of protec-
tion of speech without which democracy cannot function."''
B. Early Network Projections and First Amendment Values
It is ironic that, by asserting their first amendment rights, the
broadcasters may be undermining the very core of first amend-
ment values. As noted, studies and surveys indicate that early
network projections of the outcome of presidential elections
decrease voter turnout and adversely affect state and local con-
tests, which are often decided much later on election night.'22
By decreasing the number of participants in the democratic
process to the point where the outcome of an election could be
significantly affected, early network projections diminish the
integrity of our electoral process.
The problem is really not one of conflicting values, 23 but
rather, it involves a single value-the successful operation of a
system of self-government. Courts and commentators have re-
peatedly characterized this principle as a primary goal of the
first amendment.124  The question then becomes one of how
best to achieve it. "[C]onsistency demands that first amend-
ment doctrine respect and seek to maintain the essential integ-
rity of [our democratic system] .125 Since early network
projections tarnish this integrity, absolute first amendment
119. A. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 62.
120. Id. See also Meiklejohn, supra note 106, at 255; Bork, supra note 107, at 26; Bev-
ier, supra note 107, at 311.
121. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 23-58.
123. Nevertheless, one writer has interpreted the problem as a conflict between the
first amendment rights of broadcasters and the public's right to vote. Note, Restricting
the Broadcast of Election-Day Projections: A Justifiable Protection of the Right to Vote,
9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (1984). However, even though early projections convince
many that it is no longer necessary to vote, such projections do not interfere with the
exercise of that right by those who choose to do so.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 108-21.
125. BeVier, supra note 107, at 310.
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protection of this practice is contrary to a key value which the
amendment intended to preserve.
C. Traditional First Amendment Considerations
Proponents of early network projections argue in terms of
traditional first amendment considerations, i.e., the high de-
gree of protection for political speech and the heavy presump-
tion against the imposition of prior restraints.
1. Political Speech
In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission,126 the
Supreme Court stated,
The First and Fourteenth Amendments remove "governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the deci-
sion as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of
each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
.127
It is hardly surprising that "[a] t the core of first amendment
values is the right to espouse political views,' 28 particularly
when the political views are expressed in connection with elec-
tions. In Buckley v. Valeo,129 the Court stated "it can hardly be
doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns
for political office." 130 The court of appeals echoed this belief in
CBS v. FCC,'3 1 in which it pointed out that "the public's right
to be informed is nowhere stronger than in the area of
elections.' 1 32
Such a degree of protection is hardly surprising when one
considers the first amendment values discussed above. If the
goal is a more informed voting public, then it becomes essen-
tial that political speech be left unrestricted. However, it is im-
portant to note that early projections do not provide
information useful to voters in choosing candidates or evaluat-
ing issues; they simply tell viewers how the networks have
evaluated a random poll of people who voted up to a particular
126. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
127. Id. at 534 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
128. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d. 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1981).
129. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
130. Id. at 15 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Ray, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
131. 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), affid, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
132. Id. at 24.
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point in time. Furthermore, the proposed restrictions on early
network projections would not prohibit the broadcasting of the
actual results when they become available; only projections
would be prohibited, and even these would be allowed once all
polls close across the country. Therefore, despite the high de-
gree of protection of political speech, the measures advo-
cated-narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of early
network projections-would not significantly interfere with the
public's right to be informed; in fact, as previously discussed,
they should improve, rather than damage, the integrity of our
electoral process.
The notion that certain restrictions on broadcasters enhance,
rather than diminish, the values associated with freedom of ex-
pression is not new. Congress and the courts have recognized
that broadcasters are fundamentally different from the print
media and, therefore, must be held to a different standard of
accountability.133 The foundation of this standard is the FCC's
mandate that broadcasters act in the public interest.'34 Two
manifestations of this requirement are the fairness doctrine'35
and the obligation to provide reasonable access. 36
The fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to air conflicting
views on issues of public importance. 37 One aspect of the fair-
ness doctrine is the requirement that broadcasters give indi-
viduals the opportunity to respond to a personal attack.138 In
answer to broadcasters' claims that their first amendment
rights were violated by this rule, the Court in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC39 noted that "the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters is paramount."'
40
Reasonable access involves the obligation of broadcasters to
allow candidates for federal office to purchase reasonable
133. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
134. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 307, 309 (West Supp. 1984).
135. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
136. 47 U.S.C.A. § 312(a)(7)(West Supp. 1984).
137. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377.
138. The personal attack rule is no longer part of the fairness doctrine. The Federal
Communications Commission believed that it had become counterproductive to the
goals of the doctrine because it discouraged discussion of important issues. However,
the court's decision to give the public interest priority is still applicable. See generally
In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules Regarding Personal Attacks and Applicability
of the Fairness Doctrine to Section 315 "Uses," Report and Order, 78 F.C.C.2d 457
(1979).
139. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
140. Id. at 390.
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amounts of air time. 141 In CBS, Inc. v. FCC,1 the three major
networks sought review of a decision by the FCC that they had
failed to meet this statutory duty.143 The federal court of ap-
peals upheld the Commission's decision as "a constitutionally
acceptable accommodation between, on the one hand, the pub-
lic's right to be informed about elections and the right of candi-
dates to speak and, on the other hand, the editorial rights of
broadcasters."'144
Of course, encouraging broadcasters to provide coverage of
candidates and issues must be distinguished from discourag-
ing networks from making projections of election outcomes
before the polls close. Nevertheless, Red Lion and CBS illus-
trate that even content-based restrictions can be imposed on
broadcasters in order to safeguard first amendment values. 45
When the public interest conflicts with the editorial discretion
of broadcasters, the former is entitled to a higher degree of pro-
tection, even in the realm of political speech.
2. Prior Restraint
Arguably, any attempt to prevent early network projections
would constitute a prior restraint." The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that there is a heavy presumption against the
constitutional validity of any system of prior restraint.147 Ac-
cording to Alexander Bickel,
Prior restraints fall on speech with a brutality and a finality all
their own. Even if they are ultimately lifted they cause irreme-
diable loss-a loss in the immediacy, the impact, of
speech.... Indeed, it is the hypothesis of the First Amend-
ment that injury is inflicted on our society when we stifle the
141. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (1983).
142. 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
143. The Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee requested a 30-minute slot be-
tween 8:00 PM and 10:30 PM on December 4, 5, 6, or 7 in 1979. The networks refused to
make that much time available so early in the campaign. Id.
144. CBS, 629 F.2d at 25.
145. Id. at 29 (Tamm, J., concurring).
146. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 724-31 (1978).
147. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding unconstitutional nuisance pen-
alties for publication of periodicals containing defamatory materials); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (staying an injunction to prevent publication of
the "Pentagon Papers"); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (striking
down an attempt to prevent distribution of "objectionable" books); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (setting aside an attempt to get injunction
against "blockbusting" literature).
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immediacy of speech.148
Prior restraints have been allowed in cases involving obscen-
ity149 and in those situations where the restraint was found to
be reasonably incidental to the attainment of another valid
governmental interest.5 0 Thus, "[it has never ... been sug-
gested that all previous restraints on speech are invalid.''5
"[T] hat the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is
stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be pro-
hibited ... is undoubtedly true. .. ."s Therefore, it is neces-
sary to consider whether the interests which justify restricting
early network projections are sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption against prior restraints.
The integrity of our elections is not only "basic to a demo-
cratic society,' ' 53 but also a primary value which the first
amendment is intended to preserve.154 Furthermore, while re-
stricting early projections would have some impact on the "im-
mediacy of speech," the magnitude of this effect is no greater
than that caused by the daily practice of delaying news broad-
casts for west coast viewers. Additionally, these restrictions
deal with the broadcast, as opposed to print, media. As noted
above, restrictions on broadcasters' first amendment rights are
more likely to be upheld.' Therefore, when one considers the
importance of the interests threatened by early projection,
along with the narrowness and brevity of the restrictions advo-
cated, it appears that a prior restraint on early projections can
be justified.
148. A. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 61.
149. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Prior restraints on obscenity are permis-
sible because obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. See generally J. No-
wAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 1010 (1983).
150. See, e.g., Veterans and Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional Commis-
sioner of Customs, 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.) (upholding a law prohibiting plaintiffs from
receiving literature from North Vietnam in order to prevent that country from deriving
economic benefit), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972).
151. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961).
152. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 715-16.
153. United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 108-21.
155. CBS, 629 F.2d at 30 n.4 (Tamm, J., concurring) (explaining the double standard
applied to print and broadcast media and distinguishing Red Lion from Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
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V
Conclusion
Over the years, networks have refined the skills necessary to
project the outcome of an election before the polls close. If left
unrestrained, they will continue to do so, and as a result voter
turnout could decline further. Of the numerous solutions pro-
posed to remedy the problem, most fail to account for the dif-
ferent means available to networks for obtaining the desired
information. In this sense, they are easily circumvented. Di-
rect restrictions that would prohibit broadcasters from making
projections before polls close nationwide raise important first
amendment issues. Nevertheless, despite the fact that such re-
strictions would impinge on the freedom of the press and
rights of viewers to receive information, they would help pre-
serve the primary value protected by the first amendment-the
success of our system of self-government. 156 This interest out-
weighs any other first amendment claims by the broadcasters.
Claimed first amendment immunity should not be used to de-
fend early projections, if such projections deter people from
voting and thereby undermine the integrity of our elections.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 108-21.
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